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…the more we try to unpack the notion of evidence for the sake of clarity, the more
problematic it becomes, especially in trying to provide adequate justifications for
educational policy making issues. (p. 119)
Abstract
 The authors ask us to explore the topic of "qualitative confirmation" in relation to the
processes and outcomes of qualitative research practice. The question that directs their inquiry is
"how can we make a case that qualitative data or findings warrant the inferences about the topics
we are studying?" We review the historical discussion of confirmation theory within the logic of
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discovery, consider hypothesis generation and methodological decisions as instruments of the
research process and then apply the Miller and Fredericks framework of rules to a published
report of qualitative research (Glass, 1997). Full bibliographic references may be viewed by
clicking on References (below) or on one of the linked citations in the text. We end our review
with an appreciation of the work.
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Purpose of our Review 
The purpose of our review is to engage the reader in further discourse on this topic
of qualitative confirmation. We will use Miller and Fredericks' (M&F) work as a
vehicle to initiate debate and demonstrate its usefulness for critiquing published
qualitative research studies.
Review Method 
Following a review of the historical roots of confirmation theory and a description
of M&F's method for establishing qualitative confirmation, we will apply the
method to a journal article by Sandra Rubin Glass (1997), an extensive
investigation of teacher and principal autonomy in both private and public schools.
Her article is an attractive example because she offers readers ready access to much
of her original data.
Historical Roots of Qualitative Confirmation
From a historical perspective, M&F take advantage of the logic provided by
positivist theories of confirmation (e.g., Carnap, 1962, Hempel, 1965; Swinburne,
1973) and apply it to qualitative research. The authors argue that the use of a
hypothesis and numerical probability statements continues to lend weight and
credibility to conventional research and they seek to persuade us to transfer
elements of the positivist paradigm to qualitative research. They recognize that
"confirmation theory" involves complex issues and its application in the
postpositivist arena is not a simple matter. Swinburne(1973) claimed that
confirming one's findings must be reduced to probability (computational)
statements, but M&F suggest that reducing qualitative research to quantitative
calculations would overlook the advantages that naturalistic inquiry has to offer.
From Carnap (1962), the term "confirmation" involves issues of classification
(what is evidence), quantity (how much is good evidence) and comparison (what is
the degree of firmness among the evidence).
In M&F's eyes, this raises important questions: whether numericallybased evidence
is an option and whether the term confirmation can have different connotations.
From Hempel's (1965) constitutive and regulative rules of confirmation, M&F
recognize that hypotheses can be further supported by propositions if the
propositions are defined legally and/or operationally. Again borrowing from the
positivist school, issues related to indeterminacy and incommensurability (Quine, 
1963, p.5,9) are introduced. If there is no objective reality and several data
collection methods are allowed, triangulation is just as likely to yield contradictory
views as it is to produce supportive ones. Which translation manual (2) should one 
use (indeterminacy)? Similarly, if competing translation theories inform the
observations, and therefore cannot logically be used to determine which theory is
correct (incommensurability), what does one use to make a decision? Charting the
logic underlying one's inquiry process lends validity or correctness to the
inferences (see also LeCompte & Preissle, 1993). They do not require translation
manuals congruent with one's epistemological and ontological assumptions, but
instead prompt the researcher to outline what other translations are possible and
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determine which one or ones would be valid and why. Most qualitative researchers
select their preferred method of inquiry, make a general statement about the data
and show a few excerpts; this does not mean, however, that the selected process or
the inferences are valid. M&F believe that in every study there is an a priori or a 
posteriori hypothesis, whether explicitly stated or nor, and that there can and
should be a demonstration of how one's epistemological and ontological
assumptions, triangulation approach, translation manuals and weighing of evidence
link the evidence to that hypothesis. They adapt Hempel's rules to qualitative
research (Hempel , 1965) and introduce the term, "qualitative confirmation." 
Definition of Qualitative Confirmation 
M&F define the term as: "those logical conditions that must obtain between the
evidence and hypothesis" (p. 11). The authors admit that the term is an
"oxymoronicsounding label" (p.1). However, they argue that their adaptation of the
Hempel rules helps decide whether the logic underlying the methods chosen and
the sampling and the weighing system for the evidence satisfies the conditions of
qualitative confirmation. The rules are also expected to help one minimize the
influence of personal bias. M&F recommend a systematic way of conducting and
critiquing qualitative research that makes explicit the researcher's process from
start to finish and highlights where pitfalls can be prevented. As already noted, one
begins with an a priori or a posteriori hypothesis, which may be a transformation of
the research question. This emphasis on a hypothesis would seem to set M&F apart
from other qualitative research theorists (e.g., Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Stake,
1995), but we think not. See, for example, Strauss and Corbin (1990) on "The
Research Question" (pp. 36-39), and Stake, Chapter 2 (pp. 15-33).
The overt thinking that guides the process and the resulting evidenceinstances (3)
will ultimately be used to support or reject the hypothesis. This act of specifying
one's logic, guided by rules, touches all phases of the qualitative research process;
it is a demonstration why the planned activities and resulting evidence support the
hypothesis. M&F state: " In other words, qualitative data have to 'demonstrate' their
utility as potential evidential candidates for confirmation. It is not simply a matter
of amassing positive evidence-instances for a hypothesis, but also showing why
they contribute to supporting a given hypothesis" (p. 33, emphasis in original).
Thus, qualitative confirmation provides a way of reporting the researcher's thought
processes, helps promote a constructivist approach to qualitative research and
answers the demand for increased rigor that Miles and Huberman (1984) identify:
"Despite a growing interest in qualitative studies, we lack a body of clearly-defined
methods for drawing valid meaning from qualitative data. We need methods that
are practical, communicable, and not selfdeluding; scientific in the positivist's
sense of the word, and aimed toward interpretive understanding in the best sense of
that term" (p. 21). 
Return to the Contents Table.
Go on to the next section.
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Description of the Book
This is a scholarly book, in conception and content (but alas not in execution). We
mean by "scholarly" that it digs deep for core concepts in what has been written
about qualitative research methods-ideas, constructs, images that help us
understand more than one case study, more than one ethnography, more than one
narrative. Do such "core concepts" exist? Miller & Fredericks (M&F) think so.
Otherwise how could they organize a book around the construct "qualitative
confirmation"? What could it possibly mean to "confirm" findings from qualitative
research? Reading Smith and Heshusius (1986) or Wolcott (1994), one might
doubt the possibility.
Then there is postmodernism: doubt, doubt, doubt; everywhere we look there is
doubt. A few years ago, the head of the British Museum of Natural History
reviewed challenges to Darwinian theories of evolution and found merit in some of
them. Attacked by critics for sowing doubt, he replied, "Doubt is splendid stuff."
(4) Doubt may indeed be splendid stuff, but we humans seem to crave something
else, something more solid in our mental life--something such as confirmation.
M&F offer material that is relevant to researchers everywhere but their editors have
done them a disservice by presenting the work in a careless and awkward way. The
lack of bold faced type and subheadings make an already difficult text even more
difficult to read. References are given at the end of each chapter and each
appendix, except for Chapter Three which has none. As a result, several are
missing and there are many duplications. Outright errors appear that would be
caught by even a cursory glance from an editor. (5) A curious feature of the book is
that of its 153 pages, 62 are devoted to three appendixes which contain crucial
elaboration or explanation. That said, we believe these authors provide a unique
and powerful contribution to qualitative research--concepts and procedures that are
worthy of study. Confirmation is the central concept of the book, a concept M&F
argue, and we agree, has not been adequately addressed within the qualitative field.
Chapter One
Confirmation theory is introduced as the "major issue in qualitative inquiry",
defining it as a description of what it means to say that the evidence relates to the
hypothesis in the qualitative process. It is "the theory of when and how much
different evidence renders different hypotheses probable" (Swinburne, 1973, p vi). 
It is acknowledged that this process is not free from assumptions and thus evidence
can ultimately only be known through the senses. What constitutes data depends
largely on who is looking for it; where mathematics may deal with pure fact,
physics may not. The concept of weighing the evidence is introduced and weighing
is distinguished from weight. Weight refers to the outcome while the weighing is
the process of arriving at the outcome. In addition, weight can only be assessed by
giving a rationale for the weighing of the evidence. Although M&F concede the
concerns that have arisen over Hempel's classical framework of rules (1965), they
value it and build directly upon it. Hempel defined: hypothesis, observation report,
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observation sentence, entailment, direct confirmation, confirmation and
development of a hypothesis for a class of individuals. (quoted by M&F on pages 8
and 9). They also cite Carnap (1962), who argued that although confirmation is
central to understanding the evidence relationship, the term is also susceptible to
different interpretations. Carnap, however, relied on computational interpretations
and M&F argue that that would defeat the purpose of qualitative confirmation. The
authors' intent is to use a non-probability framework to focus on a logic of
discovery while not excluding the possibility of validation. 
Since evidence comes in so many forms, rules are needed to help assess the
evidence in relation to the research question (hypothesis). It is also necessary to
develop a series of related but separate rules which bear only on the
characterization of the data itself (p.12). M&F suggest that the ways qualitative
researchers make a case for their findings will depend on two major aspects: the
labeling of and the justification for using the rules. Two categories of rules are
required: constitutive (defining what counts as a social situation or practice) and
regulative (prohibiting or prescribing actions in situations defined by constitutive
rules-taken from Greenwood, 1989). ). In their discussion, M&F are "trying to
understand what it means to be 'rational' in pursuing the activities of qualitative
inquiry" (p. 14), and they reach back to "camps" defined by Wittgenstein, Popper
and Donald Davidson (1984) for insight into rationality. To the present reviewers
surprise, they then add "sociologists" to the list, a camp that "tries to determine the
extent 'natives' hold their beliefs even in the face of (supposedly) other more
'rational' beliefs" (p. 14). Sociologists?
The last "camp" specializes the thorny and recurring issue of "translation", an issue
that permeates any discussion of qualitative research. Whenever we use words to
communicate the behaviour and/or feelings of others, the communication involves
translation even when we all seem to be speaking the same language. Translation is
discussed in every chapter of M&F, from many perspectives. Translation issues
revolve around the ideas of indeterminacy and incommensurability. These two
constructs are not dealt with at length. The "indeterminacy thesis" is: "because
theories of meaning (i.e. those referring to natural languages) are not concerned
with 'the fact of the matter', as are scientific theories in the natural sciences, it is
possible to derive multiple translation manuals which may be incompatible but
adequate for interpreting the behavior in question." The "incommensurability
thesis" suggests that there is not even one translation manual that is adequate, as
when trying to choose between two competing theories, for example (p.15). (For a
comprehensive discussion of these concepts see Quine, 1960.) Translation is often
at the level of data analysis rather than confirmation. Rationale for data collection
processes and the subsequent description or translation of the data often is directed
by the chosen research methodology. M&F close Chapter One with six statements
describing how the above considerations relate to the notion of qualitative
confirmation. 
Chapter Two
The second chapter is devoted to the subject of hypotheses in qualitative research,
not surprisingly since hypotheses are central to their entire approach. Hypotheses
are viewed broadly "as statements which direct inquiry, in a Deweyan sense, in
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relation to a theoretical framework, but without the necessity of such hypotheses
being strictly deducible from such a framework" (p. 21). A priori hypotheses may
emerge where the researcher has a theoretical framework in mind, for example,
beginning with a category of behavior and linking it to a category of individuals. In
contrast, the researcher may begin with an interest in a category of individuals and
subsequently seek to link them to a category of behavior. M&F argue that both are
qualitative because they are formulated in the context of a qualitative study and
because their confirmation is dependent on qualitative data; they dodge the obvious
tautology by acknowledging that both types can be formulated as well in
quantitative studies. Confirmation, they say, is central to all research activities, but
in qualitative research it is based on plausible logical relations which apply first to
the data and then to the hypothesis. Qualitative research seeks to understand human
behavior "from a perspective which, methodologically, requires qualitative data"
(p. 25). Rules, they say, are needed if a case for qualitative confirmation is to be
made. Since rules must apply both to data and hypothesis, M&F undertake to
define what they mean by data-and their definition is entirely conventional: field
notes, interview data, historical accounts and the like (pp. 26-7). The term
"evidence-instance" is introduced to describe a discrete item of information to be
put forward as part of a confirmation argument. A long elaboration on the meaning
of "evidence" is presented in Appendix B, including more discussion how data
become evidence. ( 6 )
They discuss triangulation, breaking no new ground, and then tackle the really
tough question: what counts as evidence and how do you judge its importance?
Nothing new here, and we are all reassured to read, "It becomes quite difficult,
then, to develop hard-and-fast rules for determining appropriate 'weighting'
procedures for these kinds of issues" (p. 30). Some considerations that "may be
helpful" include:
The weight of the data-evidence is not necessarily synonymous with the
"amount" of the data-evidence. The term "weight" can be loosely translated
as an "absence of negative cases," that is, disconfirming instances. …
Where the term "amount" of evidence is used, the implication is that some of
the evidence must consist of (negative) disconfirming instances. …
M&F assert that contrary findings do not necessarily disconfirm the original
hypothesis, for they may serve to clarify a previously unknown dimension. The
matter of confirming vs. disconfirming instances is discussed more fully in Chapter
Three. They tell us that using more than one data set can enhance the validity or
reliability of data if it can be shown that the data sets are relevant to the
problem--however, they neglect to explain how this can occur. M&F relate the
purposes of using a triangulation process but the inherent problems associated with
it are listed and not explained. We recommend that those unfamiliar with the
process of triangulation consult other sources.
In what must have been an afterthought, the final paragraph of the final section,
"Conclusions", introduces a muddled discussion of the terms "relationship" and
"association". Hopes that the muddle will be cleared up are not fulfilled. 
Chapter Three. 
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In chapter three M&F present their four rules for qualitative confirmation and
instruct us in the use of these rules, including how to handle negative cases or cases
of disconfirmation. Overall, it is the most carefully constructed and clearly
presented chapter. How qualitative findings may become evidence for a hypothesis
or research question is the focus of the discussion here and the authors impress us
with how their qualitative research rules apply to both sides of the research
continuum. One advantage claimed for researchers is that the rules allow for the
development of qualitative research studies with confirmation in mind. They also
suggest how research findings are to be interpreted when choosing data sets. As for
qualitative disconfirmation, some additional advice is given in the interpretation of
negative evidenceinstances. Researchers usually have to use the qualifier "some"
instead of "all" (QuineDuhem Thesis) because scientific theories may be composed
of auxiliary hypotheses for certain predictions (p.48). Auxiliary hypotheses can
allow incompatible evidence while still not disconfirming the original hypothesis.
The null hypothesis also finds a place in Miller and Frederick's qualitative
confirmation theory.
Chapter Four. 
Chapter Four moves into the practical application of rules to five articles published
since 1980. M&F pick up on a suggestion from Miles and Huberman (1984) that
researchers ask systematically a series of questions before, during and after the
research: (p.53): . what is (are) the major research question(s) or hypotheses? .
what method(s) will be used and what sort of data yielded? will other(indirect) data
sources be utilized? . how will the case be made that the research
question/hypothesis has been or has not been confirmed? . if mixed data sources
are used, how will they be handled in terms of confirmation/ disconfirmation? All
researchers are advised to include a final section in the research report (possibly as
an appendix) which explicitly addresses the issue of qualitative confirmation. Such
a section helps the researcher focus on the larger epistemologicaltheoretical
questions raised by the study and reminds us that the presentation of our findings
can be regarded as a type of translation manual as well as a demonstration of the
rigor in one's research.
The application of confirmation theory to the five caseshelps a little to understand
M&F's method, but their choice of articles left much to be explained. A graduate
student listed 20 reports of qualitative research from the years 1970-1990. The
same student selected 7-10 for further study, in an attempt to present a "rough cross
section" of work. In our view, a more qualitative approach would have been
preferable: purposive choice to illustrate application of the rules rather than this
version of sampling. In only one study, for example, was there any attempt to
discuss negative or disconfirming instances. In most there was no attention to the
issue of confirmation, but in one or two there was an implicit suggestion that
confirmation had been achieved. There was no discussion of the weighing the
evidence in making qualitative claims. Given the rather radical nature of M&F's
proposals, it should perhaps come as no surprise that research conducted and
published more than a decade ago does not adhere closely to the Rules. In order to
help future researchers, M&F provide a "Checklist for Qualitative Confirmation" at
the end of the chapter, including the questions mentioned above and ending with
"What, after all, has one discovered/concluded from this investigation? Is it truly
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warranted?" (p. 66-7)
Chapter Five. 
The final chapter (before those three long appendixes, that is) is entitled,
"Epistemological Asides and Conclusions"; fearlessly confronting the big question
of "truth". Suppose a study has met all the criteria for qualitative confirmation, "Is
this all that is necessary for declaring that the findings, then, are 'true'?" (p. 73)
M&F advise us to look at various philosophical camps, bringing Winch again
(1958, 1964) and again invoking the "camps" (from Chapter One). Qualitative
confirmation provides a framework for establishing qualitative data as evidence for
the hypothesis, that is, it meets the requirement of rationality, but it is less
successful as regards indeterminacy. It is not possible to rule out different or
competing translation manuals.
As readers will have gathered by now, this concept of "indeterminacy" pervades
the book--as it does the field of qualitative research. It is a way the philosophers
have discussed whether there can be any "truth" and the way M&F discuss the
prevailing view in qualitative circles that there is no truth-there are no methods that
allow us to reduce indeterminacy to zero. Readers may feel, with justification, that
M&F's discussion of the concept is fragmented and incomplete. Fear not;
Appendix A (24 dense pages) is devoted to it. 
Appendix A. Some notes on the nature of methodological indeterminacy.
Here the authors return to the intellectual roots of qualitative confirmation and
elaborate the construct, "methodological indeterminacy". M&F revisit Quine and
lean heavily on Roth's 1987 book, Meaning and method in the social sciences: A
case for methodological pluralism. Roth, echoing Winch (1958), opens his book by
referring to "the general collapse of positivism" and concludes (following Quine)
that multiple translation manuals are not only possible but inevitable. There is no
"fact of the matter" in relation to the human sciences.
Where can we go from here? Undaunted, M&F press on, seeking to dodge the
philosophical bullet by concentrating on practical concerns, namely methods.
…the genuine problem of indeterminacy for the human sciences does
not lie at the level of debates concerning "hermeneutic" vs "scientific
empirical" views of human action, but rather at the level of specific
methodological techniques that ultimately are the constitutive
elements for determining the existence (or lack of it) of indeterminant
translations. (p. 93, emphases in original)
……
To be clear, we are not arguing that the definition of methodology as
the application of specific techniques and procedures is sufficient to
resolve indeterminacy in all situations, but only that it is a necessary
condition both to establish its existence and to demonstrate possible
ways of reducing it. (p. 94, emphasis in original)
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Some clarity does emerge: specific techniques and procedures (methods) are
needed to establish the existence of indeterminacy. It is always there, we suppose,
but until you apply the techniques and procedures (collect the data?), you don't see
it Now that positivism has collapsed, we go farther: application of methods "may
generate a type of indeterminacy" (p 101), or "types of indeterminacy that are 
produced by competing methodologies" (p. 103, emphasis added). This is surely
correct, because different methods bring to light different amounts and kinds of
indeterminacy-hence the term, "methodological indeterminacy". M&F borrow from
quantitative methods and discuss differences "between" and "within"
methodological approaches, with regard to both qualitative and quantitative
approaches. The discussion of qualitative approaches is much more insightful than
that of the quantitative, the latter naïve and verging on the trivial. We question
M&F's assertion, citing Fuller (1988), that "there is a heavier 'burden of proof' on
the qualitative side of the equation for showing either indeterminacy or lack of it."
(p. 105) A better statement, in our opinion, is that for practicing researchers,
"indeterminacy is usually perceived itself as a 'working hypothesis'; one which may
never in principle be unequivocally 'accepted' or 'rejected' but one, nevertheless,
that is capable of empirical inquiry." (p. 105)
Appendix A concludes with a short discussion of the status of theory in the human
sciences. (M&F leave no topic completely untouched!) They cite a belief among
"some quantitative researchers" that improvements in measurement will solve our
problems, including give us better theories. In our opinion, they have it backwards:
better theories lead to better measures (and the process recycles). Let M&F have
the last word, with which we completely agree:
On the other hand, for those who do not see the possibility (or usefulness) of
equating the human sciences with the natural sciences, the indeterminacy reflected
by methodological applications can be "reduced" over time, but its reduction is
directed towards making human behavior more "intelligible" rather than more
"scientific". (p. 108)
Appendix B. Clarifying the "adequate evidence condition" in educational theory
and research
The authors set out to convince us how important it is to clarify what they call the
"evidence condition". Lack of attention to what is meant by evidence "has resulted
in a restricted view of this term with a correspondingly unwarranted optimism
regarding the formulation, implementation and evaluation of educational policies
and practices." (p. 117) Faithful to their book title, they promise a thick description
type of analysis to attain their goal. If "dense" is the same as "thick", then they
deliver on this promise.
Israel Scheffler (1965) is cited early, as we would expect, and not just because he
introduced the phrase, "adequate evidence condition". No discussion of evidence in
educational research would be complete without at least a mention of this classic.
New sources to us are Lakoff (1987) Women, fire, and dangerous things: What 
categories reveal about the mind, and Lakoff & Johnson (1980) Metaphors we live
by, insightful discussions of the nature and process of category creation. Since
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qualitative researchers live and die by their categories, these are helpful references
for anyone (such as the authors of this review) who had overlooked them. The
process of categorization is the formation of "Idealized Cognitive Models
…culturally unique and semantically-based modes of perception and reasoning
whereby users of a language construct cognitively-based models to explain social
and physical reality." (p. 124) There are five types of models: Cluster, Metonymic,
Social Stereotype, Ideal and Metaphoric.
We are not attempting a summary of this appendix. M&F describe the concept of
evidence as having "entrenched ambiguity" and "overall complexity", and after
reading the appendix several times we heartily agree. Lawyers and judges struggle
with it daily, of course, and law schools have whole courses on it. M&F also write,
"Paradoxically, however, the more we try to unpack the notion of evidence for the
sake of clarity, the more problematic it becomes, especially in trying to provide
adequate justifications for educational policy making issues." (p. 119) Here are a
few points to give the flavour of the work.
Among the ambiguities cited is the "conflation" of the terms evidence and data, as
we noted in the description of Chapter Two and in Note (6). According to M&F,
data are candidates for evidence but only become evidence "to the extent that they
are consistent with both the larger class of rules identified with the particular
methodological approach, and with the rules regulating the application of a
particular technique or tool within the methodological approach." (p. 118) Whew!
Educational implications are offered, including ambiguities surrounding the
concept of "school effectiveness" and the lack of consensus on adequate evidence
for effectiveness. You might not agree with everything they write, but you will be
led to think hard about it.
Appendix C. Reciprocal paradigm shifts and educational research: A further view
of the quantitative-qualitative dilemma
In the concluding appendix, M&F state their belief and concern that while those
involved in educational research perceive a paradigm shift from quantitative to
qualitative inquiry, many are not convinced that the qualitative-interpretationist
view can be sustained on the basis of conventional scientific criteria. Some, Miles
and Huberman (1985) for example, manage to sidestep this issue and some
recognize qualitative research but believe that the eventual testing or proof of
causality or theoretical prediction must be left to scientific empiricism (Popper,
1969, Rosenberg,1988). M&F concentrate their discussion on the interpretationist
framework and they examine some commonly held assumptions that underlie the
two research processes. They present their position that quantitative and qualitative
approaches need not be viewed as contradictory in terms of some educational
problems within some contexts, and a methodological mix is not only possible but
desirable.
Miller and Fredericks do not agree with the asumption that scientific empirical data
is quantitative data and that the constructs of validity and reliability are crucial
issues only in quantitative studies.
One of our central claims will be that not only are the crucial issues of reliability
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and validity perfectly general across all research based forms of inquiry; but also
that in meeting the requirements of reliability and validity, interpretationist
accounts may yield warranted conclusions that, while different in form and content
from scientific empirical claims, can, nevertheless, be compatible with them. (p.
137)
They remind us that these assumptions have their roots in the traditional
confirmation theory of Carnap (1962) and Hempel (1958) and are drawn from a
"probabalistic-operational" perspective. This approach to the definition of
scientific evidence seems to rule out the possibility of interpretationist accounts of
data that can only be understood rationally as qualitative data. In response, they put
forward and discuss the following assumptions (p. 139):
interpretationist accounts within the human sciences are correctly based on
the direct or presumptive use of non-quantitative research strategies,
1.
these strategies must be viewed as being fundamentally different in their
qpplication and in the interpretation of the data they produce from those
research strategies based on probability assumptions,
2.
they are, nonetheless, subject to the general scientific constraints of
reliability and intersubjectivity, and
3.
they can be employed as alternative means for "confirming" hypotheses
and/or providing for critical tests for theoretical perspectives.
4.
These assumptions lead them to confident statements about the tough issues of
causality and theoretical interpretation of reports from qualitative studies. "First,
the qualitative research agenda stipulates only that causal connections (as either
necessary or sufficient conditions) of behavior be meaningful in terms of the
native's own accounts and that such connections be accurately described. Secondly,
the investigator's theoretical interpretation of these accounts can incorporate 
'higher order' or more general constructs, but without the implication that their use
must necessarily 'reduce' the original accounts." (p. 145, emphasis in original)
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Other views relevant to qualitative confirmation
This section is presented to place M&F within the larger qualitative research
community. Our discussion is in no way a complete review of the voluminous
literature; it highlights different interpretations of the hypothesis setting process,
validty and reliability concerns and understandings of translation and triangulation
methods. In this section, we emphasize with italics the words that seem to us to be
versions of confirmation. In many ways, LeCompte and Preissle (1993) support
M&F's concept of qualitative confirmation. LeCompte and Preissle agree, at least
metaphorically, that validity is involved in many aspects of the inquiry process:
"How validity is defined and treated varies according to what researchers do, what
tasks they are undertaking, and in what phase or stage of the research they are in"
(p. 325). Theoretical frameworks, general design, context, participants, researcher
experience and procedures of data collection and analysis have a bearing on the
issue of validity. As LeCompte and Preissle say, "Consequently, although we urge
scholars to discover and formulate what their research philosophy is, we believe
that it is only one factor contributing to how validity is defined" (p. 326). They also
caution, as do M&F, that replacing qualitative processes with strictly quantitative
ones erroneously prompts a single consolidated definition of validity and
potentially jeopardizes richness of detail and creativity. For LeCompte and
Preissle, qualitative research is idiosyncratic and data analysis entails an emergent
process: "Even midway through an analysis,uncertainty and frustration accompany
the unfolding direction" (p. 330). They see qualitative research as loosely
connecting researchers who come from a broad spectrum of philosophical
traditions; there is not just one. They could ask that all the different qualitative
researchers state how their philosophies decide validity and then apply those
guidelines to the study, but they stop short of this because they see it as an a priori
assignment approaching "determinism" (p. 326).
A comparison of their descriptions of research phases demonstrates how they
propose to obtain validity (or qualitative confirmation) especially in the areas of:
formulating goals, developing a research design, selecting data sources,
experiencing and directing the research, collecting data, collaboration, comparing
phenomenon and data analysis. Part of developing research questions is to ensure
that the research goals, the context of the situation and the interests of the
stakeholders are aligned. M&F would say that this process entails what must also
be considered when developing a hypothesis. Much of the discussion around
validity stems from concerns about the sources that are assumed to provide
validity. LeCompte and Preissle argue (as do M&F) that qualitative research
methodologies cannot discount the range of ontological and epistemological
assumptions and theories that are at their disposal. The key to validity is that
researchers must be aware of and acknowledge the use of disparate views. The
kinds of evidence colleagues accept as legitimate and adequate may be affected by
who is being studied. More data may be required because of who is going to
scrutinize the results. Therefore, who or what is to be studied must be considered
when deciding on a design. This is similar to M&F's concept of weighing (but not
'weighting').
Will there be other extraneous factors such as background evidence that needs to
weigh into the confirmation of the hypothesis? Researcher's background and role in
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the investigation are central to how the validity is addressed:
History teaches that attention to the individual researcher is relevant to
validity in qualitative research. What background and training does the
researcher bring to the investigation? How carefully, thoroughly,
openly, and honestly are researchers known to do their work? Who
was responsible for the researcher's training? What reputation has the
scholar earned in previous investigations? What does the researcher
report about participation in the research? Introspective and reflective
amounts of influence on what is seen and heard contribute to the
audience's confidence that the researcher attempted to track these
factors." (p.329).
This is similar to M&F' constitutive and regulative rule that revealing the
researcher's training and practice as well as the ethical or operational practices will
help us assess how much credibility can be given to the researcher's work. 
LeCompte and Preissle agree with M&F that a systematic way of collecting data
can be used to give more credence than one that is not. Both pairs also agree that
just because something is done correctly, it may strengthen the research but does
not necessarily mean that the results are sufficient to meet the criteria. LeCompte
and Preissle suggest many ways for researchers to enhance confidence in their
results, for example, through collaborative participation with the participant,
congruency between theory and observation, intermethod and interobserver checks,
personal reflection and introspection. Therefore, although LeCompte and Preissle
would determine their analysis procedures at a different stage than M&F, they do
agree with M&F that several options are available. Both agree that one should use
multiple methods to reduce the possibility that bias will affect the credibility or
validity of the results.
LeCompte and Preissle do not strive to provide conventional external validity
because small sample sizes usually make this task impossible. However, they state
that comparing phenomenon is useful and can be achieved by defining the
"typicality" (Wolcott, 1973) of a phenomenon. Threats to comparing phenomenon
are whatever obstructs or reduces a study's translatability. Translatability is the
degree to which the researcher can adopt theoretical frames, definitions and
research techniques accessible to and understood by other researchers in the same
or related disciplines. Thus LeCompte and Preissle agree with M&F that
alternative translations should be considered. However, LeCompte and Preissle
think of translatability in terms of its usefulness in linking with others, whereas
M&F think of translatability for reducing bias and confirming evidence or a
hypothesis.
The one other area in which LeCompte and Preissle are distinct from M&F is in
data analysis. LeCompte and Preissle state simply that one cannot predict what will
happen, that trying to develop and use a template to direct the data analysis is
impossible. They feel that "qualitative analysis is interpretive, idiosyncratic and so
context dependent as to be infinitely variable. A creative analyst can never be sure
that the ending will match the point of view adopted in the beginning" (p.330). In
closing, LeCompte and Preissle agree with M&F that a single definition of validity
is inappropriate for qualitative research. In a qualitative confirmation process, all
authors agree that concerns about validity touch every part of the inquiry.
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LeCompte and Preissle use triangulation to understand a phenomenon; M&F use
triangulation to confirm a hypothesis.
Guba (1981) outlined several paradigms for discovering "truth". These include a
judicial paradigm that has well established rules for procedure, rules of evidence
and criteria for judging the adequacy of the rationale for a proceeding. This judicial
paradigm offers guidelines for behaviour. Another paradigm is that of expert
judgement. The third is what he refers to as the rationalistic paradigm and is
essentially connected to deductive thinking and a logical positivist point of view.
The paradigm he obviously prefers is the naturalistic. The naturalistic is
characterized by inductive thinking, and phenomenological views of knowing and
understanding social and organizational phenomena. He notes that there are shades
of grey in viewing these paradigms and that often they are seen as competing but in
the task of knowledge production they are all important. Guba stresses that the
naturalistic ecological hypothesis is imbedded in a context which is often more
powerful in shaping behaviour than differences among individuals. In conclusion,
Guba states that understanding the reality of the world requires acceptance of the
notion that the parts cannot be separated. He further concludes that because of the
assumptions underlying naturalistic enquiry the traditional concerns for objectivity,
validity and reliability have little relevance for the design of the research. The
validity of the findings is related to the careful recording and continual verification
of the data that the researcher undertakes during the investigative practice. This is
consistent with Wolcott (1990,1994).
The questions of translatability and comparability trouble qualitative researchers
(Goetz & LeCompte,1984,1993; Wolcott, 1973). Appropriate sampling improves
the generalizability of quantitative studies but researchers improve the quality of
their qualitative studies by (among other things) ensuring that units of analysis,
concepts generated, population characteristics and settings are described and
defined so that they can be compared between studies. Translatability is related to
the degree to which the researcher uses theoretical frames, definitions and research
techniques that are accessible to or understood by other researchers in similar or
related disciplines (Goetz & LeCompte,1984, p228). M&F do not hold contrary
views to these discussions of scientific validation; rather they have built upon them
in suggesting the possibility of confirmation of findings. Lincoln and Guba (1985),
in outlining their fourteen characteristics of operational naturalistic inquiry, write:
"naturalistic ontology suggests that realities are wholes and cannot be understood
in isolation from their contexts, nor can they be fragmented for separate study of
the parts; because of the belief in complex mutual shaping rather than linear
causation, which suggests that the phenomenon must be studied in its full scale
influence, and because contextual value structures are at least partly determinates
of what will be found" (p.39). Spindler and Spindler (1992), when developing their
eleven criteria for good ethnography say in Criterion II, "hypotheses emerge in situ
as the study continues. Judgments on what may be significant to the study is
deferred until the orienting phase of the field study is completed." M&F dodge
these issues for most of their book, but they confront the issues in Appendix C.
On the subject of verity and what constitutes rigor, Marshall and Rossman (1989),
suggest the use of "controls" which rely heavily on other researchers: the use of a
research partner to play devil's advocate; a constant search for negative instances
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(from Glaser and Strauss, 1967); checking and rechecking the data, and purposeful
testing for rival hypotheses; practicing "value free" note taking, and using "strictly
objective" observations; devising and applying tests to the data; using the guidance
of previous researchers to control for data quality; and conducting an audit of the
data collection and analysis strategies (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p.148). Marshall
and Rossman neglect to tell us how a research partner will play "devil's advocate",
explain what constitutes "value free" and "strictly objective" observations--nor do
they tell us what types of tests to develop, how to develop them, or at what points
we should test the data. Negative instances feature in M&F's rules, but their
discussion is thin compared to others such as the above.
Talbot (1995), lists a number of factors involved in the credibility of findings: 
remaining in the field over a long period of time; using triangulation; negative case
analysis; and having participants review researcher's interpretations and
conclusions. She would appear to be in M&F's camp, because she uses the term
"confirmability" to describe the process where findings, conclusions and
recommendations are supported by the data, and she suggests that there should be
an internal agreement between the investigator's interpretations and the actual
evidence. Confirmability is only one of four factors that establish trustworthiness
for Talbot, however, the other factors being credibility, transferability, and
dependability. In establishing credibility, she borrows from Goetz and LeCompte
(1984) who say that "establishing validity requires determining the extent to which
conclusions effectively represent empirical reality, and assessing whether
constructs devised by researchers represent or measure the categories of human
experience that occur." This definition leans far too heavily on quantitative means
in calling for a representation of empirical reality but is explicitly written and
comprehensive in description in all other respects. Credibility crops up again as 
Lincoln and Guba (1985), discuss four constructs against which the trustworthiness
of a study can be evaluated: credibility; transferability; dependability and (here's
that confirmation again) confirmability. Credibility depends on how accurately the
subject is identified and described. Transferability is noted to be impossible from
the stance of external validity, but is greatly assisted by providing the greatest
possible range of information, and thick descriptive data. The applicability of one
set of findings to another setting rests more with the later researcher making the
transfer than the original researcher. The authors point out that dependability is
difficult to predict in a changing social world. In establishing dependability, the
researcher attempts to account for changing conditions in the phenomenon chosen
for study as well as changes in the design created by increasingly refined
understanding of the setting.
The preface to Strauss & Corbin's (1990) book puts the question of confirmation
clearly up front for those who are interested in inductively building theory through
qualitative analysis of data. They state that however exciting may be the experience
of gathering data, there comes a time when the data must be analyzed and at that
time the researcher asks, "How can I have a theoretical interpretation while still
grounding it in the empirical reality reflected by my material?" "How can I make
sure that my data and interpretations are valid and reliable?" and "How do I pull all
of my analysis together to create a concise theoretical formulation of the area under
study?" The research question in grounded theory is a statement that identifies the
phenomenon to be studied. As the researcher proceeds through the process they can
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go in different directions and therefore the questions can change. M&F seem able
to accommodate this definition of research question and would assure the grounded
theory researcher that what needs confirmation is the final conceptualization of the
proposed theory and whether or not the symbols of behaviour and language to
which the researcher reacted were true. The conceptualization question is one of
confirmation; the latter is a question of methodology. Anselm & Strauss strive for
rigor with seven evaluation criteria embodied in the questions: (1) How was the
original sample selected? (2) What major categories emerged? (3) What were the
indicators that led to the development of the categories? (4) What categories
directed the theoretical sampling process? (5) What were the hypotheses pertaining
to conceptual relations among categories and how were these tested? (6) Were
there instances in which the hypothesis did not hold up to what was seen (7) How
and why was the core category selected and on what grounds were the final
analytic decisions made?
We can see within these criteria many of the issues of confirmation and
disconfirmation addressed by M&F. They also relate to the criteria for the
evaluation of qualitative research proposed by Lincoln and Guba(1985), who were
among the first to suggest criteria for good qualitative research. Strauss and
Corbin(1990) and Lincoln and Guba (1985) differ in their area of emphasis, with
Strauss and Corbin(1990) being more concerned with internal validity and Lincoln
and Guba(1985) wanting the work to shed light on other instances. M&F seek to
accommodate these different dimensions and to add a strategy that will enhance
work that has been started by others.
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Rules for Confirmation 
Qualitative confirmation rests on the assumption that there is a hypothesis or at
least a hypothetical statement for the study, that data collected through qualitative
methodologies will remain qualitative data and that this data can be manipulated
within a set of rules. M&F propose just such a set of rules for confirmation of
qualitative research. The rules are the application of deductive reasoning in an
effort to confirm that the research data logically confirm or disconfirm the
hypothesis framed for the study. To apply the rules, therefore, the researcher's first
task is to define a hypothesis; it can be either a priori or a posteriori. The next 
challenge for the researcher is to determine data collection methods that will
produce "evidenceinstances". "Evidenceinstances" are the result of the qualitative
data being recast as evidential statements for confirmation. Here are the rules,
exactly as written by M&F (pages 4142, emphasis in original):
Rule 1: The qualitative evidence instances must be positive for the
development of the hypothesis. If they constitute a denial of the hypothesis, 
they disconfirm the hypothesis (see Hempel's 9.3 Df.).
1.1 The limiting "weak" case for confirmation would be the existence
of only one positive instance, and for disconfirmation the existence of
one (and only one) negative instance.
Rule 2: If the evidence instances constitute a methodologically unique class ( 
8 ), they must (minimally) not be contradictory to one another.
2.1 As a class, the statements should entail the development of the
hypothesis, while the possibility of their own entailment(s) is left
open.
2.2 If this class consists of only two instances and they contradict each
other, then the hypothesis is neither confirmed or disconfirmed.
2.3 If this class consists of numerous instances, some of which are
contradictory to the hypothesis, then (2.2) obtains, unless it can be
shown that there are more instances (positive or negative) and these
should be counted for or against the hypothesis, or the above instances
should be given a priori "weights" in terms of importance. Note: the
assignment of these weights could be given by an agreement of
knowledgeable experts.
Rule 3: If relevant background evidence can be adduced for the hypothesis
under consideration, and if this evidence alone is sufficient for the
development (e.g., entailment) of the hypothesis, and, furthermore, if it is
non-contradictory to the class chosen as evidence for confirming the
hypothesis, then the given hypothesis may be said to be confirmed.
3.1 If the background evidence is sufficient for the development of the
hypothesis but is contradictory to the evidence chosen for
confirmation, the hypothesis' confirmation will remain undetermined. 
Rule 4:For a given hypothesis that is to be confirmed by evidence instances
derived from a variety of methodological approaches, the class comprising
these statements should first be partitioned into relevant categories, i.e.,
historical-narrative, ethnographic, documentary, quantitative, etc.
4.1 statements within categories should be internally consistent
(non-contradictory)
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4.2 Each partitioned subset need not be sufficient for the derivation of
the hypothesis, but the totality of subsets comprising the class should
be sufficient (and, hopefully necessary).
4.3 Depending on the number of subsets, if one subset contradicts the
others, either partially or wholly, the confirmation of the hypothesis is
left undetermined.
4.4 If one subset is disconfirming to the hypothesis but neutral or
non-contradictory tothe remaining subsets, and the remaining ones are
consistent, the hypothesis will be considered confirmed.
4.5 The hypothesis will be considered disconfirmed (i.e., rejected) if
(a) all subsets disconfirm, (b) if a majority disconfirm, or (c) in the
limiting case of two subsets, where one is contradictory to the other, if
additional grounds (i.e., agreement by experts) can be adduced for the
disconfirming subset, this will be taken as sufficient for
disconfirmation. (In this case the evidence has been "weighted"
towards disconfirmation; of course, the converse, i.e. for confirmation,
could be similarly argued.)
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Application of the M&F framework to the Sandra Rubin Glass
study, "Markets and Myths: Autonomy in Public and Private
Schools", published in Education Policy Analysis Archives, vol. 5, 
no. 1, January 6,1997 (the 'Glass' study) 
The title describes the article well: Glass undertook a large-scale study of teacher
and principal autonomy in public and private secondary schools and used the data
to explore claims made by Chubb and Moe (1990). She challenges the latter's
assertions: that the organization of private schools offered greater teacher
autonomy resulting in higher student achievement and that the bureaucracy of
public schools stifles autonomy and limits student achievement. Glass attempted to
bring to the surface conditions which constrain teacher and principal autonomy in
both public and private schools. Although she did not express it this way, it is
reasonable to state that she had a hypothesis: "There are no differences between
public and private schools in the amount of autonomy teachers and principals
have." She also set out to answer the question, "What conditions impede teacher
and principal autonomy in both public and private schools?", implying the
hypothesis: "There are no differences between public and private schools in the
conditions that foster or inhibit autonomy." 
In her comprehensive study, Glass used both data source and methodological
triangulation. "The methods employed in this investigation were those of the
multi-site qualitative case study: interviews from multiple data sources,
observations and field notes from a variety of on-site meetings and visits, and
analysis of documents (brochures, teacher handbooks, policy manuals, meeting
agendas)." She conducted an intensive study of three public and three private
secondary schools, interviewing fourteen private school teachers, fifteen public
school teachers; assorted principals, heads and assistants from each school were
interviewed at their respective sites. 
According to M&F, triangulation is described as a series of strategies that directs
both the generation of data and the clarification of findings . They go on to say that
the purpose of triangulation in qualitative inquiry is "to provide a rationale for
increasing the plausibility of qualitative findings" (M&F, p.28). M&F state that, "if
different data sources are used for the study of a particular problem, and if it can be
claimed that they are relevant for the problem, the likelihood for the total data set
to reflect reliability and validity will be enhanced" (p.27). The different sources
listed by Glass have face relevance to the problem and in principle enhance the
likelihood of reliability and valididy. In the journal article, however, the only data
we can identify by source is from the interviews. A set of hyperlinks allows readers
access to them as the findings are being reported. Whenever a quotation is given
from an interview, the reader may choose to examine the quoted passage in its full
context by clicking with the mouse on an icon at the margin. (Glass has taken the
extra step of directing the link to the exact location of each quotation in the
interview and highlighting the quotation in bold.) We thus have explicit examples
of the "evidence-instances" referred to in M&F's rules and an unprecedented
opportunity to assess in detail whether the evidence is "positive for the
development of the hypothesis". The thirtyseven interviews are presented in a
standardized pattern, clear and accommodating to read. She used many of the
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interview questions from the Moles (1988) and Blase's (1991) surveys (part of the
'High School and Beyond' survey) used by Chubb and Moe (1991) to develop their
index of teacher and administrator autonomy. The use of structured tools that have
been previously tested lends credibility to the data set. Participants were selected
based on years of teaching experience (at least five ), and years of experience at the
present school (at least three). The school sites were chosen so that the
constituencies of both the public and private schools were as comparable as
possible; in both private and public situations, schools servicing high income
families and focusing on academic excellence and college preparation were
selected as well as less favoured districts. Glass does not explicitly state how the
data will be used in the confirmation process (she did the work before M&F's book
was published), but she does share her process of weighing the evidence. For
M&F, this consideration is a necessary step in research design that allows for
consequent evaluation in relation to qualitative confirmation.
We now assess the Glass study for qualitative confirmation by using the M&F 
rules.
As noted in the previous section, Rule 1 states that the evidence instances must be
positive for the development of the hypothesis. If they constitute a denial of the
hypothesis, they disconfirm the hypothesis. In more than thirty interviews with
teachers and their principals, from both private and public schools, Glass found
that participants from both private and public schools experienced about the same
measure of autonomy in their environments or were able to work around conditions
that constrained it. The interviews brought out the degree of complexity inherent in
the idea of autonomy. Rule 1 is thus satisfied.
Rule 2 states that if the evidence instances constitute a methodologically unique
class, they must (minimally) not be contradictory to one another. The interviews
constitute just such a class, and the evidence instances Glass presents do not
contradict each other. In most journal articles, or even books, we have to be
content with the evidence instances provided by the author-always and necessarily
a small subset of all possible instances-but here we are able to read all the text of
all the interviews. We do not claim to have done so, but each one of us read at least
one interview through, explicitly searching for evidence instances that would
contradict the hypotheses. We found none. While the researcher does not report
explicitly on the data realized from onsite meetings, visits, and analysis of
documents, she does refer to the high achievement standards of schools,
curriculum content, parent involvement, and how arrangements were made to
collect data--information that had to be collected from these sources. Consider, for
example, the following statements from Glass's "Findings" (we have put inferences
assumed to be made from field notes and the like in bold):
In a private school, new teachers will generally define the curriculum
predicated on their own content knowledge and interest. Because of smaller
faculty numbers, there may be two or three other teachers with whom to
coordinate curriculum; yet each teacher specializes in a particular facet of
that content area. While each of the three independent schools in this study have
either a middle school or middle and elementary school as part of its organization,
students come from a variety of other schools. Consequently, coordination is a 
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matter of interest only within the upper school. Any coordination of curriculum 
is accomplished within the institution, as described by this private school teacher:
(a quotation follows, with link to the interview).
………
This study was conducted in a right-to-work state in which teacher unions are
virtually non-existent, but teacher associations are predominant. These 
associations are seen as variously strong or weak depending on locale. Only 
one of the three public schools is in a district having a very strong teacher
association. Most, if not all, of its teachers are members of the association and
quite a few are active in its leadership. The other two schools are in districts
that negotiate teachers' contracts with the association, although the faculty
are much less active.
It is not possible to confirm or disconfirm these statements from the journal article,
because the relevant evidence instances are not supplied. Those that are supplied
satisfy Rule 2, but what do we say about the others? We do not know.
The Chubb and Moe (1990) findings are presented, and we could regard them as
"background evidence" (Rule 3), but rather than being "adduced for the
hypothesis", they are findings to be questioned, and possibly to be disconfirmed.
This is an outcome of research that M&F appear not to have foreseen. Glass's
opening statement, and her analysis of data is an argument for a disconfirmation of
their report. On the other hand, background information from Sedlak (1986) and
Ball (1987) are adduced as support for Glass's hypothesis. In our opinion, the
evidence of Sedlak and Ball is not sufficient for development of the hypothesis, but
neither are they contradictory. Applying Rule 3, we would say the hypothesis is
confirmed by Sedlack and Ball but contradicted by Chubb and Moe. The
hypothesis would therefore remain as "undetermined" if the Chubb and Moe data
were sufficient. This is why Glass argues so strongly that the Chubb and Moe
evidence is, to put it mildly, not sufficient. She points out that they present no
evidence whatsoever on private schools from the "High School and Beyond" study
that is the basis for their arguments. Applying Rule 3, we conclude that the
background evidence is itself contradictory and would leave the hypothesis
undetermined. It seems as if we have to decide for ourselves how to weight the
evidence.
Rule 4 states that, "for a given hypothesis to be confirmed by evidence instances
derived from a variety of methodological approaches, the class comprising these
statements first should be partitioned into relevant categories" (p.43). In the Glass
study, as previously stated, the interview data are internally consistent, and we do
not have access to the data from the field notes, onsite meetings and visits or
document analysis. Rule 4, therefore, cannot be applied. Glass has woven
information in her discussion that makes it reasonable to acknowledge consistency
in those data, but the evidence instances are missing that would allow us to make a
strong case.
We believe that the Glass study, in employing focused interviews using open ended
questions and observations, makes a plausible case for qualitative confirmation of
her hypothesis, but applying the M&F rules did not firmly settle the matter. The
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study explores real life situations with no attempt to manipulate or control
conditions. She argues that a high degree of autonomy is experienced by teachers
and principals in both private and public schools, and that her findings disconfirm 
those of Chubb and Moe (1990) that teachers in private schools experience more
autonomy than teachers in public schools. Regarding her second hypothesis, she
identified six factors associated with autonomy: conflicting and contradictory
demands, shared beliefs, layers of protection, a system of laws, funding constraints,
and matters of the size of institutions. She concludes that autonomy is a complex
process--an issue that does not distinguish the public from the private sector. As
her only qualifier, Glass observes that similar organizational effects may not be
encountered in schools under the duress of poverty and social dislocation, perhaps
seeking to avoid the fallacy of confirming the consequent. It would appear from
this example that qualitative confirmation yet eludes us; we revisit this in our
appreciation.
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An appreciation of the book by Miller and Fredericks, Qualitative
Research Methods
Some of us attended graduate school and had our early experience in an
educational research that was dominated by experimental psychology. Prompted by
Campbell and Stanley (1963) we were concerned with the validity of our research,
but we believed that if only we found the correct experimental design and carried it
out competently our results would be valid. With methods based on the probability
calculus, we could arrive confidently at a "significance level." Others of us know
little of statistics and experimental design, having studied in programs and with
faculty who do not believe in realism and seek, for example, verstehen-"a type of
historical or contemporary insight which cognitively reconstructs a plausible
interpretation of an action or event given knowledge of the cultural 'rules'." (M&F,
p. 74) It may well be that the latter group is now dominant in educational research,
and many are quite confident in their methods and believe their results adequately
justified. Some believe no more justification is possible (e.g., Smith and 
Heshusius, 1986). At least a small subset of researchers remains uneasy that
qualitative approaches lack means for validation. It is this group that M&F
addresses, of course, those that would be extremely happy to have a means to attain
"qualitative confirmation." In our opinion, graduate students (especially those
considering qualitative methods for their research) should study and assess M&F's
rules and rationale, whatever camp they are in. M&F's presentation makes this
much more difficult than necessary, but the issue is important enough to make the
effort.
The overall organization of chapters is logical; once apprehended it is clear:
The major issue in qualitative inquiry (confirmation-and introduction to
rules)
1.
Hypotheses in qualitative research methods (defense of hypotheses and the
nature of evidence)
2.
Additional rules of confirmation (M&F's version plus discussion of
disconfirmation)
3.
Assessing qualitative studies (applying the rules to some published reports)4.
Epistemological asides and conclusions (revisiting the intellectual roots)5.
Reading through the chapters, however, one finds complex concepts and intricate
arguments that can only be clarified (usually!) by reading the appendixes:
Some notes on the nature of indeterminacy1.
Clarifying the "adequate evidence condition" in educational theory and
research
2.
Reciprocal paradigm shifts and educational research: A further view of the
quantitative-qualitative dilemma.
3.
After all this work, however, you will find that qualitative confirmation is still a
judgment call. We attempted to illustrate this with our own application of the rules
to the "Glass study". The published report of that study was attractive to us because
the "evidence instances" were so obvious and because they constituted a
"methodologically unique class". Because all the data (interviews) was available,
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we could do some verification not usually available (search for negative instances
not reported in the published version, for example). The studies analyzed by M&F
in Chapter 4 did not provide as good a test of the method, but even this good test 
ended inconclusively, IOHO.
As with all works of genuine scholarship, one of the benefits of study is the
acquaintance (or reacquaintance) it provides with key scholars and their ideas.
M&F write from outside the "college" known best by the authors of this review,
and we found many new and insightful sources. Most of us have heard of Quine
but have not studied his books. Our inadequate preparation in philosophy left us
ignorant of the seminal contributions of Winch, and we agree with M&F that, "It is
amazing how much debate has been generated by the two rather modest works of
Winch (1958, 1964)." (p. 74) Swinburne lurked unread in our library, as did Roth
(shame, shame). We were led to an even stronger appreciation of Wolcott and 
introduced to the "cognitivist and semanticist", George Lakoff. 
In summary, the presentation is sloppy, the writing dense and the organization
suboptimal, but the topic is important and the fresh perspective welcome. We wish
the authors would bring out an new and improved edition, but even if not we
recommend the book to you.
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(2)Quine uses the term "translation" in the usual sense of finding a representation
in a language of a text expressed in another, broadening and deepening the
discussion in Word and Object (1960). The term "translation manual" has been
extended to describe how a researcher understands what people in a "foreign"
culture say and do, how we make sense of field notes, for example. There will
always be more than one possible translation manual for any situation, just as there
is more than one possible translation of a text from English to French. That said,
we may argue in favour of one particular translation manual, just as we may say we
prefer one translation over another.
(3) "We will also use the phrase 'evidence-instance' to indicate that the qualitative
data are now being recast as evidential statements for confirmation." M&F, p. 41. 
(4) Recollected narrative-call it "personal communication".
(5) "obervation" (p. 8). "inherit" instead of "inherent" (p. 16). "accept" where
"except" is intended (p. 22). "was" when "were" is correct (p. 44). viewed (p. 45). 
"this not entail …" does need "does" (p. 94). "or" (not 'of') (p. 119). "intact" rather
than "in tact" (p. 145). References are missing from the end of Chapter 3, e.g.
Miller (1990)!
(6) M&F argue in the same spirit as Clyde Coombs (1964), who distinguished
between "observations" and "data" (he dealt only with observations in the form of
numbers). What M&F call data, Coombs called observations, which only became
data after application of one of the scaling techniques coming to fruition and/or
being developed by Coombs. The spirit is that information, whether qualitative or
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quantitative, comes to every researcher first in a raw form that must be refined
before it can be used to make inferences.
(7) Some of Hempel's rules (from M&F, p. 11):
9.1 Df. An observation report B directly confirms a hypothesis H if B entails the
development of H for the class of those objects which are mentioned in B.
9.2 Df. An observation report B confirms a hypothesis H if H is entailed by a class
of sentences each of which is directly confirmed by B.
9.3 Df. An observation report B confirms a hypothesis H if it confirms a denial of
H.
9.4 Df. An observation report B is neutral with respect to a hypothesis H if B
neither confirms nor disconfirms H.
(8) By a 'methodologically unique class', we mean a situation where the researcher
employs one dominant form of data collection, such as interviews, for instance.
While such a situation is probably not realistic, it is a logical possibility and for
this reason is included. (p. 42).
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